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A bstract. A constructive proof of the Godel-Rosser incompleteness the­
orem [9] has been completed using the Coq proof assistant. Some theory 
of classical first-order logic over an arbitrary language is formalized. A 
development of primitive recursive functions is given, and all primitive 
recursive functions are proved to be representable in a weak axiom sys­
tem. Formulas and proofs are encoded as natural numbers, and functions 
operating on these codes are proved to be primitive recursive. The weak 
axiom system is proved to be essentially incomplete. In particular, Peano 
arithmetic is proved to be consistent in Coq’s type theory and therefore 
is incomplete.
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1 In trodu ction
The Godel-Rosser incompleteness theorem for arithmetic states th a t any com­
plete first-order theory of a nice axiom system, using only the symbols + , X,
0, S, and <  is inconsistent. A nice axiom system must contain the nine specific 
axioms of a system called NN. These nine axioms serve to define the previous 
symbols. A nice axiom system must also be expressible in itself. This last re­
striction prevents the incompleteness theorem from applying to axioms systems 
such as the true first order statem ents about .
* This paper appears in the proceedings of the 18th International Conference on The­
orem Proving in Higher Order Logics (TPHOLs 2005)
A computer verified proof of Godel’s incompleteness theorem is not new. 
In 1986 Shankar created a proof of the incompleteness of Z2, hereditarily fi­
nite set theory, in the Boyer-Moore theorem prover [11]. My work is the first 
computer verified proof of the essential incompleteness of arithmetic. Harrison 
recently completed a proof in HOL Light [6] of the essential incompleteness of S 1- 
complete theories, but has not shown th a t any particular theory is Si-complete. 
His work will be included in the next release of HOL Light.
My proof was developed and checked in Coq 7.3.1 using Proof General under 
XEmacs. It is part of the user contributions to Coq and can be checked in Coq
8.0 [14]. Examples of source code in this document use the new Coq 8.0 notation. 
Coq is an implementation of the calculus of (co)inductive constructions. This
dependent type theory has intensional equality and is constructive, so my proof is 
constructive. Actually the proof depends on the Ensembles library which declares 
an axiom of extensionality for Ensembles, but this axiom is never used.
This document points out some of the more interesting problems I encoun­
tered when formalizing the incompleteness theorem. My proof mostly follows the 
presentation of incompleteness given in A n  Introduction to M athematical Logic 
[10]. I referred to  the supplementary text for the book Logic fo r  M athematics 
and Com puter Science [1] to construct Godel’s ^-function. I also use part of 
C aprotti and Oostdijk’s contribution of Pocklington’s criterion [2] to prove the 
Chinese remainder theorem.
This document is organized as follows. First I discuss the difficulties I had 
when formalizing classical first-order logic over an arbitrary language. This is 
followed by the definition of a language LNN and an axiom system called NN. 
Next I give the statem ent of the essential incompleteness of NN. Then I briefly 
discuss coding formulas and proofs as natural numbers. Next I discuss primitive 
recursive functions and the problems I encountered when trying to prove that 
substitution can be computed by a primitive recursive function. Finally I briefly 
discuss the fixed-point theorem, Rosser’s incompleteness theorem, and the in­
completeness of PA. At the end I give some remarks about how to extend my 
work in order to formalize Godel’s second incompleteness theorem.
1.1 C o q  N o ta tio n
For those not familiar with Coq syntax, here is a short list of notation
— ->, / \ ,  \ / ,  and ~ are the logical connectives ^ ,  A, V, and —.
— A -> B, A * B, and A + B form function types, Cartesian product types, 
and disjoint union types.
— *, +, and S are the arithmetic operations of multiplication, addition, and 
successor.
— i n l  and in r  are the left and right injection functions of types A -> A + B 
and B -> A + B.
— : : ,  and ++ are the list operations cons, and append.
— _ is an om itted parameter tha t Coq can infer itself.
For more details see the Coq 8.0 reference manual [14].
2 F irst-O rder C lassical Logic
I began by developing the theory of first order classical logic inside Coq. In 
essence Coq’s logic is a formal metalogic to reason about this internal logic.
2.1 D e fin itio n  o f Language
I immediately took advantage of Coq’s dependent type system by defining 
Language to be a dependent record of types for symbols and an arity function 
from symbols to N. The Coq code is:
Record Language : Type := language 
{R e la tio n s  : S e t;
F unctions : S e t;
a r i t y  : R e la tio n s  + F unctions -> n a t} .
In retrospect it would have been slightly more convenient to use two arity func­
tions instead of using the disjoint union type.
This approach differs from Harrison’s definition of first order terms and for­
mulas in HOL Light [5] because HOL Light does not have dependent types. 
Dependent types allow the type system to enforce th a t all terms and formulas 
of a given language are well formed.
2.2 D e fin itio n  o f Term
For any given language, a Term is either a variable indexed by a natural number 
or a function symbol plus a list of n  terms where n  is the arity of the function 
symbol. My first attem pt at writing this in Coq failed.
V ariab le  L : Language.
(* In v a lid  d e f in i t io n  *)
In d u c tiv e  TermO : Set :=
| varO : n a t -> TermO
| applyO : f o r a l l  (f  : F unctions L) ( l  : L is t  TermO),
( a r i ty  L ( in r  _ f ) )= ( le n g th  l )  -> TermO.
The type ( a r i ty  L ( in r  _ f ) )  = ( le n g th  l )  fails to meet Coq’s positivity re­
quirement for inductive types. Expanding the definition of le n g th  reveals a 
hidden occurrence of TermO which is passed as an implicit argument to len g th . 
It is this occurrence tha t violates the positivity requirement.
My second attem pt met the positivity requirement, but it had other difficul­
ties. A common way to create a polymorphic lists of length n is:
In d u c tiv e  V ector (A : S et) : n a t -> S et :=
| V nil : V ector A O 
| Vcons : f o r a l l  (a : A) (n : n a t ) ,
V ector A n -> V ector A (S n ).
V ariab le  L : Language.
In d u c tiv e  Terml : Set :=
| v a r l  : n a t -> Terml 
| ap p ly l : f o r a l l  f  : F unctions L,
(V ector Terml ( a r i ty  L ( in r  _ f ) ) )  -> Terml.
My difficulty with this definition was tha t the induction principle generated by 
Coq is too weak to work with.
Instead I created two m utually inductive types: Term and Terms.
V ariab le  L : Language.
In d u c tiv e  Term : S et :=
| var : n a t -> Term 
| apply  : f o r a l l  f  : F unctions L,
Terms ( a r i ty  L ( in r  _ f ) )  -> Term 
w ith  Terms : n a t -> S et :=
| T n il : Terms O 
| Tcons : f o r a l l  n : n a t ,
Term -> Terms n -> Terms (S n ) .
Again the automatically generated induction principle is too weak, so I used the 
Scheme command to generate suitable mutual-inductive principles.
The disadvantage of this approach is tha t useful lemmas about Vectors must 
be reproved for Terms. Some of these lemmas are quite tricky to prove because 
of the dependent type. For example, proving f o r a l l  x : Terms O, T n il = x 
is not easy.
Recently, Marche has shown me tha t the Terml definition would be adequate. 
One can explicitly make a sufficient induction principle by using nested F ix p o in t 
functions [7].
2.3 D e fin itio n  o f Formula
The definition of Formula was straightforward.
In d u c tiv e  Formula : S et :=
| equal : Term -> Term -> Formula
| atom ic : f o r a l l  r  : R e la tio n s  L, Terms ( a r i ty  L ( in l  _ r ) )  -> 
Formula
| impH : Formula -> Formula -> Formula 
| notH : Formula -> Formula 
| fo ra llH  : n a t -> Formula -> Formula.
I defined the other logical connectives in terms of impH, notH, and fo ra llH .
Using this I could have defined Term like:
The H at the end of the logic connectives (such as impH) stands for “Hilbert” 
and is used to distinguish them from Coq’s connectives.
For example, the formula —Vx0 .Vxi .x0 =  x 1 would be represented by:
notH (fo ra llH  O (fo ra llH  l  (equal (v a r O) (var l ) ) ) )
It would be nice to  use higher order abstract syntax to handle bound variables 
by giving fo ra llH  the type (Term -> Formula) -> Formula. I would represent 
the above example as:
notH (fo ra llH  (fun x : Term =>
(fo ra llH  (fun y : Term => (equal x y ) ) ) ) )
This technique would require addition work to disallow “exotic terms” th a t are 
created by passing a function into fo ra llH  tha t does a case analysis on the 
term  and returning entirely different formulas in different cases. Despeyroux et 
al. [3] address this problem by creating a complicated predicate tha t only valid 
formulas satisfy.
Another choice would have been to  use de Bruijn indexes to  eliminate named 
variables. However dealing with free and bound variables with de Bruijn indexes 
can be difficult.
Using named variables allowed me to closely follow Hodel’s work [10]. Also, in 
order to  help persuade people th a t the statem ent of the incompleteness theorem 
is correct, it is helpful to make the underlying definitions as familiar as possible.
Renaming bound variables turned out to be a constant source of work during 
development because variable names and terms were almost always abstract. In 
principle the variable names could conflict, so it was constantly necessary to 
consider this case and deal with it by renaming a bound variable to a fresh one. 
Perhaps it would have been better to use de Bruijn indexes and a deduction 
system tha t only deduced closed formulas.
2.4 D e fin itio n  o f su b s titu teF o rm u la
I defined the function su b s titu teF o rm u la  to substitute a term  for all oc­
currences of a free variable inside a given formula. While the definition of 
su b s titu teT e rm  is simple structural recursion, substitution for formulas is com­
plicated by quantifiers. Suppose we want to substitute the term  s for x* in the 
formula V x j  .<p and i =  j . Suppose Xj is a free variable of s. If we naively perform 
the substitution then the occurrences of Xj in s get captured by the quantifier. 
One common solution to this problem is to disallow substitution for a term  s 
when s is not substitutable for x* in y>. The solution I take is to rename the 
bound variable in this case.
def(Vxj .^>)[xj/s] =  V xk .(y>[xj/ x k ])[x*/s] where k =  i and x k is not free in ^  or s
Unfortunately this definition is not structurally recursive. The second substitu­
tion operates on the result of the first substitution, which is not structurally 
smaller than the original formula.
Coq will not accept this recursive definition as is; it is necessary to prove 
the recursion will terminate. I proved th a t substitution preserves the depth of a 
formula, and tha t each recursive call operates on a formula of smaller depth.
One of McBride’s m antras says, “If my recursion is not structural, I am us­
ing the wrong structure” [8, p. 241]. In this case, my recursion is not structural 
because I am using the wrong recursion. Stoughton shows tha t it is easier to 
define substitution tha t substitutes all variables simultaneously because the re­
cursion is structural [13]. If I had made this definition first, I could have defined 
substitution of one variable in terms of it and many of my difficulties would have 
disappeared.
2.5 D e fin itio n  o f P rf
I defined the inductive type (P rf Gamma p h i) to be the type of proofs of phi, 
from the list of assumptions Gamma.
In d u c tiv e  P rf  : Formulas -> Formula -> S et :=
I AXM : f o r a l l  A : Form ula, P rf  (A :: n i l )  A 
I MP : f o r a l l  (Axmi Axm2 : Form ulas) (A B : Form ula),
P rf  Axmi (impH A B) -> P rf  Axm2 A ->
P rf (Axmi ++ Axm2) B 
I GEN : f o r a l l  (Axm : Form ulas) (A : Formula) (v : n a t ) ,
" In  v (freeV arL istF o rm ula  L Axm) -> P rf Axm A ->
P rf Axm (fo ra llH  v A)
I IMPi : f o r a l l  A B : Formula, P rf n i l  (impH A (impH BA) )
I IMP2 : f o r a l l  A B C :  Form ula,
P rf  n i l  (impH (impH A (impH B C))
(impH (impH A B) (impH A C)))
I CP : f o r a l l  A B : Formula,
P rf  n i l  (impH (impH (notH A) (notH B)) (impH BA) )
I FAi : f o r a l l  (A : Formula) (v : n a t)  ( t  : Term),
P rf  n i l  (impH (fo ra llH  v A) (su b s titu te F o rm u la  L A v t ) )
I FA2 : f o r a l l  (A : Formula) (v : n a t ) ,
" In  v (freeV arForm ula L A) ->
P rf n i l  (impH A (fo ra llH  v A))
I FAS : f o r a l l  (A B : Formula) (v : n a t ) ,
P rf  n i l
(impH (fo ra llH  v (impH AB) )
(impH (fo ra llH  v A) ( fo ra llH  v B )))
I EQi : P rf  n i l  (equal (v a r O) (var O))
I EQ2 : P rf  n i l  (impH (equal (var O) (v a r i ) )
(equal (var i )  (va r O)))
I EQS : P rf  n i l
(impH (equal (v a r O) (var i ) )
(impH (equal (var i )  (var 2 )) (equal (var O) (var 2 ) ) ) )
I EQ4 : f o r a l l  R : R e la tio n s  L, P rf  n i l  (AxmEq4 R)
| EQ5 : f o r a l l  f  : F unctions L, P rf  n i l  (AxmEq5 f ) .
AxmEq4 and AxmEq5 are recursive functions tha t generate the equality axioms for 
relations and functions. AxmEq4 R generates
x 0 — X1 —^ • • • —^ x 2n- 2 =  x 2n- 1 (R (x07 . . . 7 x 2n - 2) R (x 17 • • • 7 x 2n - 1))
and AxmEq5 f  generates
Xo — X1 ^  . . .  ^  X2„-2 =  X2n-1 ^  ƒ (xo, . . . , X2n - 2) — ƒ ( x i , . . . , X2n - l)
I found tha t replacing ellipses from informal proofs with recursive functions 
was one of the most difficult tasks. The informal proof does not contain informa­
tion on what inductive hypothesis should be used when reasoning about these 
recursive definitions. Figuring out the correct inductive hypotheses was not easy.
2.6 D e fin itio n  o f SysPrf
There are some problems with the definition of P rf  given. It requires the list 
of axioms to  be in the correct order for the proof. For example, if we have P rf 
Gammal (impH phi p s i)  and P rf  Gamma2 ph i then we can conclude only P rf 
Gamma1++Gamma2 p s i . We cannot conclude P rf Gamma2++Gamma1 p s i  or any 
other permutation of p s i .  If an axiom is used more than once, it must appear 
in the list more than once. If an axiom is never used, it must not appear. Also, 
the number of axioms must be finite because they form a list.
To solve this problem, I defined a System to be Ensemble Formula, and 
(SysPrf T p h i) to  be the proposition th a t the system T proves phi.
D e f in it io n  System := Ensemble Formula.
D e f in it io n  mem := E nsem bles.In .
D e f in it io n  SysPrf (T : System) (f  : Formula) := 
e x is t s  Axm : Form ulas,
( e x is ts  p r f  : P rf Axm f ,
( f o r a l l  g : Formula, In  g Axm -> mem _ T g ) ) .
Ensemble A represents subsets of A by the functions A -> Prop. a : A is consid­
ered to be a member of T : Ensemble A if and only if the type T a is inhabited. 
I also defined mem to be E nsem bles.In  so th a t it does not conflict with L is t . I n .
2.7 T h e  D e d u c tio n  T h eo rem
The deduction theorem states tha t if r  U {<p} h 0  then r  h <p ^  0.
There is a choice of whether the side condition for the V-generalization rule, 
" In  v (freeV arL istF o rm ula  L Axm), should be required or not. If this side 
condition is removed then the deduction theorem requires a side condition on it. 
Usually all the formulas in an axiom system are closed, so the side condition on
the V-generalization is easy to show. So I decided to keep the side condition on 
the V-generalization rule.
At one point the proof of the deduction theorem requires proving tha t if 
r  U {p} h ^  because ^  G r  U {p}, then r  h p  ^  ^ . There are two cases 
to consider. If ^  =  p  then the result easily follows from the reflexivity of ^ .  
Otherwise ^  G r , and therefore r  h ^ . The result then follows. In order to 
constructively make this choice it is necessary to decide whether ^  =  p  or not. 
This requires Formula to be a decidable type, and tha t requires the language L 
to be decidable. Since L could be anything, I needed to add hypotheses tha t the 
function and relation symbols are decidable types.
— f o r a l l  x y : F unctions L, { x=y } + { x<>y }
— f o r a l l  x y : R e la tio n s  L, { x=y } + { x<>y }.
I used the deduction theorem without restriction and ended up using the hy­
potheses in many lemmas. I expect tha t many of these lemmas could be proved 
without assuming the decidability of the language. It is hard to imagine a use­
ful language th a t is not decidable, so I do not feel too bad about using these 
hypotheses in unnecessary places.
2.8 L an g u ag es a n d  T h eo rie s  o f N u m b e r T h eo ry
I created two languages. The first language, LNT, is the language of number 
theory and just has the function symbols P lus, Times, Succ, and Zero with 
appropriate arities. The second language, LNN, is the language of NN and has 
the same function symbols as LNT plus one relation symbol for less than, LT.
I define two axiom systems: NN and PA. NN and PA share six axioms.
1. Vx0.—S x 0 =  0
2. Vx0.Vx1.(S x 0 =  S x 1 ^  x 0 =  x 1)
3. Vx0.x0 +  0 =  x 0
4. Vx0.Vx1.x0 +  S x 1 =  S (x 0 +  x 1)
5. Vx0.x0 X 0 =  0
6. Vx0.Vx1.x0 X S x 1 =  (x0 X x 1) +  x 0
NN has three additional axioms about less than.
1. Vx0.—x 0 <  0
2. Vx0.Vx1.(x0 <  S x 1 ^  (x 0 =  x 1 V x 0 <  x 1))
3. Vx0.Vx1.(x0 <  x 1 V x 0 =  x 1 V x 1 <  x 0)
PA has an infinite number of induction axioms tha t follow one schema.
1. (schema) Vxj;1. . . .  Vxin.p [x j/0 ] ^  V xj.(p  ^  p [x j / S x j ]) ^  V xj.p
The x j j , . . . ,  x in are the free variables of Vxj .p. The quantifiers ensure tha t all 
the axioms of PA are closed.
Because NN is in a different language than PA, a proof in NN is not a 
proof in PA. In order to reuse the work done in NN, I created a function
called LNN2LNT-formula to convert formulas in LNN into formulas in LNT by 
replacing occurrences of t 0 <  t \  with (3x2.x0 +  (S x 2) =  x i) [x 0/ t 0, x i / t i ] — 
p [x 0/ t 0, x 1/ t 1] is the simultaneous substitution of t 0 for x 0 and t 1 for x 1. Then 
I proved tha t if NN h p  then PA h LNN2LNT_formula(p).
I also created the function natToTerm : n a t -> Term to return the closed 
term  representing a given natural number. In this document I will refer to this 
function as r .n, so r 0n =  0, r 1n =  S0, etc.
3 C oding
To prove the incompleteness theorem, it is necessary for the inner logic to reason 
about proofs and formulas, but the inner logic can only reason about natural 
numbers. It is therefore necessary to code proofs and formulas as natural num­
bers.
Godel’s original approach was to code a formula as a list of numbers and 
then code tha t list using properties from the prime decomposition theorem [4]. 
I avoided needing theorems about prime decomposition by using the Cantor 
pairing function instead. The Cantor pairing function, cP a ir, is a commonly 
used bijection between N  x N  and N.
All my inductive structures were easy to recursively encode. I gave each con­
structor a unique number and paired tha t number with the encoding of all its 
parameters. For example, I defined codeFormula as:
F ix p o in t codeFormula (f  : Formula) : n a t := 
match f  w ith
| fo l .e q u a l  t l  t2  => c P a ir  O (c P a ir  (codeTerm t l )  (codeTerm t 2 ) )
| fol.im pH  f l  f2  =>
c P a ir  l  (c P a ir  (codeFormula f l )  (codeFormula f2) )
| fo l.n o tH  f l  => c P a ir  2 (codeFormula f l )
| f o l . f o r a l lH  n f l  => c P a ir  3 (c P a ir  n (codeFormula f l ) )
| fo l .a to m ic  R t s  => c P a ir  (4+(codeR R)) (codeTerms _ t s )  
end.
where codeR is a coding of the relation symbols for the language.
I will use r p n for r codeFormula p n and r t n for r codeTerm t n.
4 T he S ta tem en t o f Incom pleteness
The incompleteness theorem states the essential incompleteness of NN, meaning 
that for every axiom system T  such that
-  NN C T
-  T  can represent its own axioms
-  T  is a decidable set
then there exists a sentence p  such tha t if T  h p  or T  I---- ip then T  is inconsistent.
The theorem is only about proofs in LNN, the language of NN. This statement 
does not show the incompleteness of theories tha t extend the language.
In Coq the theorem is stated as as:
Theorem Incom pleteness
: f o r a l l  T : System,
Inc luded  Formula NN T ->
R e p re sen ts ln S e lf  T ->
D ecidab leS et Formula T -> 
e x i s t s  f  : Formula,
Sentence f  / \
(SysPrf T f  \ /  SysPrf T (notH f )  -> In c o n s is te n t  LNN T).
A System is In c o n s is te n t  if it proves all formulas.
D e f in it io n  In c o n s is te n t  (T : System) := 
f o r a l l  f  : Form ula, SysPrf T f .
A Sentence is a Formula without any free variables.
D e f in it io n  Sentence (f  : Formula) :=
f o r a l l  v : n a t ,  ~ In  v (freeV arForm ula LNN f ) .
A D ecidab leS et is an Ensemble such tha t every item either belongs to  the 
Ensemble or does not belong to the Ensemble. This hypothesis is trivially true 
in classical logic, but in constructive logic I needed it to prove the strong con­
structive existential quantifier in the statem ent of incompleteness.
D e f in it io n  D ecidab leS et (A : T ype)(s : Ensemble A) := 
f o r a l l  x : A, mem A s x \ /  ~ mem A s x.
The R ep re sen tsIn S e lf hypothesis restricts what the System T  can be. The
statem ent of essential incompleteness normally requires T  be a recursive set. 
Instead I use the weaker hypothesis tha t the set T  is expressible in the system 
T.
Given a system T  extending NN and another system U along with a formula 
p u  with at most one free variable x*, we say p u  expresses the axiom system U 
in T  if the following hold for all formulas 0.
1. if 0  G U then T  h p u [x j/r 0 n]
2. if 0  G U then T  I---- ipu [x*/r 0 n]
U is expressible in T  if there exists a formula p u  such th a t p u  expresses the 
axiom system U in T.
In Coq I write the statem ent T  is expressible in T  as
D e fin it io n  R ep re sen tsIn S e lf (T : System) := 
e x is t s  rep  : Formula, e x i s t s  v : n a t ,
( f o r a l l  x : n a t ,  In  x (freeV arForm ula LNN rep ) -> x = v) / \  
( f o r a l l  f  : Form ula,
mem Formula T f  ->
SysPrf T (su b s titu te F o rm u la  LNN rep  v
(natToTerm (codeFormula f ) ) ) )  / \
( f o r a l l  f  : Form ula,
~ mem Formula T f  ->
SysPrf T (notH (su b s titu te F o rm u la  LNN rep  v
(natToTerm (codeFormula f ) ) ) ) ) .
This is weaker than requiring tha t T  be a recursive set because any recursive set 
of axioms T  is expressible in NN. Since T  is an extension of NN, any recursive 
set of axioms T  is expressible in T.
By using this weaker hypothesis I avoid defining what a recursive set is. Also, 
in this form the theorem could be used to prove tha t any complete and consistent 
theory of arithmetic cannot define its own axioms. In particular, this could be 
used to prove Tarski’s theorem tha t the tru th  predicate is not definable.
5 P rim itive  R ecursive Functions
A common approach to proving the incompleteness theorem is to prove that 
every primitive recursive function is representable. Informally an n-ary function 
f  is representable in NN if there exists a formula f  such that
1. the free variables of f  are among x 0, . . . ,  x n .
2. for all a 1 , . . . , an : ,
NN h ( f  ^  Xo =  f  (al, .. ., an)n) [x l / r a l n, .. ., X n/r ann]
I defined the type PrimRec n as:
In d u c tiv e  PrimRec : n a t -> Set :=
I succFunc : PrimRec i 
I zeroFunc : PrimRec O
I projFunc : f o r a l l  n m : n a t ,  m < n -> PrimRec n 
I composeFunc :
f o r a l l  (n m : n a t)  (g : PrimRecs n m) (h : PrimRec m), 
PrimRec n 
I primRecFunc :
f o r a l l  (n : n a t)  (g : PrimRec n) (h : PrimRec (S (S n ) ) ) ,  
PrimRec (S n) 
w ith  PrimRecs : n a t -> n a t -> Set :=
I PRnil : f o r a l l  n : n a t ,  PrimRecs n O 
I PRcons : f o r a l l  n m : n a t ,
PrimRec n -> PrimRecs n m -> PrimRecs n (S m).
PrimRec n is the expression of an n-ary primitive recursive function, but it is 
not itself a function. I defined evalPrimRec : f o r a l l  n : n a t ,  PrimRec n 
-> naryFunc n to convert the expression into a function. Rather than work­
ing directly with primitive recursive expressions, I worked with particular Coq 
functions and proved they were extensionally equivalent to the evaluation of 
primitive recursive expressions.
I proved tha t every primitive recursive function is representable in NN. This 
required using Godel’s ^-function along with the Chinese remainder theorem. 
The ^-function is a function tha t codes array indexing. A finite list of numbers 
a0, . . . ,  an is coded as a pair of numbers (x, y) and ^(x, y, i) =  a*. The ^-function 
is special because it is defined in terms of plus and times and is non-recursive. 
The Chinese remainder theorem is used to prove tha t the ^-function works.
I took care to  make the formulas representing the primitive recursive func­
tions clearly Z'1 by ensuring th a t only the unbounded quantifiers are existential; 
however, I did not prove tha t the formulas are ^ 1 because it is not needed for 
the first incompleteness theorem. Such a proof could be used for the second 
incompleteness theorem [12].
5.1 codeSubFormula is P r im itiv e  R ecu rs iv e
I proved tha t substitution is primitive recursive. Since substitution is defined 
in terms of Formula and Term, it itself cannot be primitive recursive. Instead I 
proved tha t the corresponding function operating on codes is primitive recursive. 
This function is called codeSubFormula and I proved it is correct in the following 
sense.
codeSubFormula(r p n, i, r sn) =  r p [x j/s ]n
Next I proved that it is primitive recursive. This proof is very difficult. The 
problem is again with the need to rebind bound variables. Normally one would 
attem pt to create this primitive recursive function by using course-of-values re­
cursion. Course-of-values recursion requires all recursive calls have a smaller code 
than the original call. Renaming a bound variable requires two recursive calls. 
Recall the definition of substitution in this case:
def(Vxj .p)[xj/s] =  V xk .(p [x j /x k])[xj/s] where k =  i and x k is not free in p  or s
If one is lucky one might be able to make the inner recursive call. But there is 
no reason to suspect the input to the second recursive call, p [ x j /x k], is going 
to have a smaller code than the original input, Vxj .p.
If I had used the alternative definition of substitution, where all variables 
are substituted simultaneously, there would still be problems. The input would 
include a list of variable and term  pairs. In this case a new pair would be added 
to the list when making the recursive call, so the input to  the recursive call could 
still have a larger code than the input to  the original call.
It seems tha t using course-of-values recursion is difficult or impossible. In­
stead I introduce the notion of the trace of the computation of substitution. 
Think of the trace of computation as a finite tree where the nodes contain the
input and output of each recursive call. The subtrees of a node are the traces 
of the computation of the recursive calls. This tree can be coded as a number. 
I proved tha t there is a primitive recursive function tha t can check to see if a 
number represents a trace of the computation of substitution.
The key to solving this problem is to create a primitive recursive function 
that computes a bound on how large the code of the trace of computation can 
be for a given input. W ith this I created another primitive recursive function 
that searches for the trace of computation up to this bound. Once the trace is 
found—I proved tha t it must be found—the function extracts the result from 
the trace and returns it.
5.2 checkPrf is P r im itiv e  R ecu rs iv e
Given a code for a formula and a code for a proof, the function checkPrf returns
0 if the proof does not prove the formula, otherwise it returns one plus the code of 
the list of axioms used in the proof. I proved this function is primitive recursive, 
as well as proving tha t it is correct in the sense tha t for every proof p of p  
from a list of axioms r , checkPrf (r p n, rp n) =  1 +  r T n; and for all n, m : N  if 
checkPrf (n, m) =  0 then there exists p, r , and some proof p of p  from r  such 
that r p n =  n  and rp n =  m.
For any axiom system U expressible in T, I created the formulas codeSysPrf 
and codeSysPf. codeSysPrf [x0/ r n n, x 1 / r m n] is provable in T  if m is the code 
of a proof in U of a formula coded by n. codeSysPf [x0/ r n n] is provable in T  if 
there exists a proof in U of a formula coded by n.
codeSysPrf and codeSysPf are not derived from a primitive recursive func­
tions because I wanted to prove the incompleteness of axiom systems tha t may 
not have a primitive recursive characteristic function.
6 F ixed  P oin t T heorem  and R osser’s In com pleteness  
T heorem
The fixed point theorem states tha t for every formula p  there is some formula
0 such that
NN h 0  ^  p [x , / r 0 n]
and th a t the free variables of 0  are tha t of p  less x*.
The fixed point theorem allows one to create “self-referential sentences” . I 
used this to  create Rosser’s sentence which states tha t for every code of a proof 
of itself, there is a smaller code of a proof of its negation. The proof of Rosser’s 
incompleteness theorem requires doing a bounded search for a proof, and this 
requires knowing what is and what is not a proof in the system. For this reason,
1 require the decidability of the axiom system. W ithout a decision procedure for 
the axiom system, I cannot constructively do the search.
6.1 In c o m p le te n ess  o f P A
To demonstrate the incompleteness theorem I used it to prove the incompleteness 
of PA. I created a primitive recursive predicate for the codes of the axioms of 
PA. Coq is sufficiently powerful to prove the consistency of PA by proving that 
the natural numbers model PA.
One subtle point is th a t Coq’s logic is constructive while the internal logic 
is classical. One cannot interpret a formula of the internal logic directly in Coq 
and expect it to be provable if it is provable in the internal logic. Instead I use a 
double negation translation of the formulas. The translated formula will always 
hold if it holds in the internal logic.
The consistency of PA along with the expressibility of its axioms and the 
translations of proofs from NN to PA allowed me to apply Rosser’s incomplete­
ness theorem and prove the incompleteness of PA—there exists a sentence p  
such tha t neither PA h p  nor PA h ip.
Theorem PAIncomplete : 
e x i s t s  f  : Form ula,
( f o r a l l  v : n a t ,  ~ In  v (freeV arForm ula LNT f ) )  / \
~ (SysPrf PA f  \ /  SysPrf PA (notH f ) ) .
7 R em arks
7.1 E x tra c t in g  th e  S en ten ce
Because my proof is constructive, it is possible, in principle, to compute this 
sentence tha t makes PA incomplete. This was not done for two reasons. The 
first reason is th a t the existential statem ent lives in Coq’s Prop universe, and 
Coq’s only extracts from its Set universe. This was an error on my part. I should 
have used Coq’s S et existential quantifier; this problem would be fairly easy to 
fix. The second reason is tha t the sentence contains a closed term  of the code 
of most of itself. I believe this code is a very large number and it is written in 
unary notation. This would likely make the sentence far to large to be actually 
printed.
7.2 R o b in so n ’s S y stem  Q
The proof of essential incompleteness is usually carried out for Robinson’s system 
Q. Instead I followed Hodel’s development [10] and used NN. Q is PA with the 
induction schema replaced with Vx0.3 x 1.(x 0 =  0 V x 0 =  S x 1). All of NN 
axioms are n 1 whereas Q has the above f f2 axiom. Both axiom systems are 
finite.
Neither system is strictly weaker than the other, so it would not be possible 
to use the essential incompleteness of one to get the essential incompleteness of 
the other; however both NN and Q are sufficiently powerful to  prove a small 
number of needed lemmas, and afterward only these lemmas are used. If one 
abstracts my proof at these lemmas, it would then be easy to prove the essential 
incompleteness of both Q and NN.
7.3 C o m p ariso n s  w ith  S h a n k a r’s 1986 P ro o f
It is worth noting the differences between this formalization of the incompleteness 
theorem and Shankar’s 1986 proof in the Boyer-Moore theorem prover. The most 
notable difference is the proof systems. In Coq the user is expected to input the 
proof, in the form of a proof script, and Coq will check the correctness of the 
proof. In the Boyer-Moore theorem prover the user states a series of lemmas and 
the system generates the proofs. However, using the Boyer-Moore proof system 
requires feeding it a “well-chosen sequence of lemmas” [11, p. xii], so it would 
seem the information being fed into the two systems is similar.
There are some notable semantic differences between Shankar’s statem ent 
of incompleteness and mine. His theorem only states tha t finite extensions of 
Z2, hereditarily finite set theory, are incomplete, whereas my theorem states 
that even infinite extensions of NN are incomplete as long as they are self- 
representable. Also Shankar’s internal logic allows axioms to define new relation 
or function symbols as long as they come with the required proofs of admissibil­
ity. Such extensions are conservative over Z2, but no computer verified proof of 
this fact is given. My internal logic does not allow new symbols. Finally, I prove 
the essential incompleteness of NN, which is in the language of arithmetic. W ith­
out any set structures the proof is somewhat more difficult because it requires 
using Godel’s ^-function.
One of Shankar’s goals when creating his proof was to use a proof system 
without modifications. Unfortunately he was not able to meet tha t goal; he ended 
up making some improvements to the Boyer-Moore theorem prover. My proof 
was developed in Coq without any modifications.
7.4 G o d e l’s S econd  In c o m p le te n ess  T h eo rem
The second incompleteness theorem states tha t if T  is a recursive system ex­
tending PA—actually a weaker system could be used here—and T  h ConT then 
T  is inconsistent. ConT is some reasonable formula stating the consistency of T , 
such as — P rT(r 0 =  S 0 n), where P rT is the provability predicate codeSysPf for 
T.
If I had created a formal proof in PA, I would have 
hpA “Godel’s first incompleteness theorem” . This could then be me­
chanically transformed to  create another formal proof in PA that 
h PA (PA h “Godel’s first incompleteness theorem” ). The reader can verify 
that the second incompleteness theorem follows from this. Unfortunately I 
have only shown tha t h Coq “Godel’s first incompleteness theorem”, so the 
above argument cannot be used to create a proof of the second incompleteness 
theorem.
Still, this work can be used as a basis for formalizing the second incom­
pleteness theorem. The approach would be to formalize the Hilbert-Bernays-Lob 
derivability conditions:
1. if PA h p  then PA h P rPA(r p n)
2. PA h PrpA(r p n) ^  PrpA(r PrpA(r p T )
3. PA h PrpA(r p  ^  0 n) ^  PrpA(r p n) ^  PrpA(r 0 n)
The second condition is the most difficult to prove. It is usually proved by first 
proving tha t for every Z'1 sentence p, PA h p  ^  P rpA(r p n). Because I made 
sure tha t all primitive recursive functions are representable by a ^ 1 formula, 
it would be easy to go from this theorem to the second Hilbert-Bernays-Loob 
condition.
8 S ta tistics
My proof, excluding standard libraries and the library for Pocklington’s criterion
[2], consists of 46 source files, 7 036 lines of specifications, 37 906 lines of proof, 
and 1 267 747 total characters. The size of the gzipped tarball (gzip -9) of all 
the source files is 146 008 bytes, which is an estimate of the information content 
of my proof.
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